ABSTRACT Security is a crucial factor for the appropriate functioning of fog/edge computing. Secured mutual authentication in networks has become key demand as per the current security standard. Several applications are in its requirements like wireless sensor network (WSN), Distributed Systems, Micro-Cloud, Smart City, Smart Industry 4.0. Problem statement is ''Design and implementation of Fog servers and edge devices to dynamically interconnect with each other using secured mutual authentication'', which is an NP complete problem. Implementation of secured mutual authentication protocol (SMAP) using techniques of pseudo-random number generator, time-stamps and hash functions can only be considered to evaluate the best performance for connecting large number of smart devices. Our protocol avoids storing master secret keys and repetition of session keys, which makes it more secure and carries no overhead. The experimental results show that the secured mutual authentication system is efficient in comparison to recent benchmarks.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are several mutual authentications schemes within broader scope of information security. Popular standard schemes known are Diffie-Hellman [1] key exchange public key protocol that requires prime and primitive value calculation with shared secret key. Whereas Kerberos [1] , a trusted third party authentication protocol requires exclusive ticket granting server and service server which faces single-point failure, stricter time requirements, etc. So deploying traditional authentication schemes requires high-end calculations and large infrastructure which is not portable and unsuitable for resource-constrained devices of the Internet of Things (IoT) [8] , [19] , [21] . Also, separate management and maintenance of such infrastructure is not cost efficient. Even though the previous schemes may be found efficient on fixed network architecture with high system configuration requirements, still their optimum performance cannot be assured with resource-constrained configuration and dynamic location changing devices. Thus, the need is felt for secured mutual authentication in emerging fog/edge computing paradigm [22] .
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1. Achieve the best performance for resource-constrained devices: As the resource constraint devices have limited system configuration, it can only support less calculation for processing. 2. Authentication of dynamical location changing devices: SMAP does not store any secret key on server and hence is not required to be in a fixed place in the network. It can work in portable mode in the wireless network. 3. Use minimum infrastructure as possible: As SMAP does not require Ticket Granting Server (TGT) and Service Server additionally, it can keep list of public keys on any Fog server node with backup keys on other Fog nodes. 4 . Unique keys for all levels and mutual authentication within fog/edge: SMAP uses timestamp for generating a new temporal and final session keys for each operation in fog/edge. Thus, it makes the system stronger than any other protocol. 5. Different security techniques for each level of mutual authentication within fog/edge: SMAP uses three different types of pseudo-random number generators with the best configurations for its effectiveness. Hence, each level differs in its features of key generation. Several applications encourage the development of Fog/Edge ahead, some of them are stated as below [24] :
Presence of multiple Fog servers [11] deployed within a university environment, where laboratory servers are utilized. The Fog server in a different laboratory having specialized facility's that include GPU processing, CUDA processing, high-performance parallel servers which can be utilized for high-end image processing and scientific job processing shared by various laptops, mobile devices, sensor's, etc. Underutilized systems will, therefore, be properly used by resource scare/demanding systems. Synchronizing with the respective departments will provide several event information to the students, faculty and staff.
B. SMART LABORATORY'S
A micro-cloud [9] , [11] can be created within a laboratory or a meeting room by treating some routers, desktop systems as fog servers. These systems may or may not be connected to the internet but can do processing of jobs in the distributed processing systems approach. Thus, underutilized systems will be effectively used within a micro-cloud network. Simulations, resource sharing, high performance distributed processing and parallel processing will be some of its applications.
C. SMART INDUSTRY
Smart Industry 4.0 [3] , [6] , [9] is a current trend in large industries having sensors at the fog/edge. Several fog servers are present at the administrative offices that collect data from groups of sensors for temperature monitoring, gas leakages, smart meters, water sprayers, etc. are used within nuclear power plants. Edge layer devices process the data at the Fog layer, generated by the sensor and can be used to send control commands to the actuator control on system maintenance, thus keeping humans out of danger [25] .
D. SMART VEHICLES
Popularly known as connected vehicles [3] , [25] which maintains active connection between several cars, bikes, bicycles, etc. for showing appropriate routes, traffic jams indications. Smart cars have inbuilt processor's and storage that allows to process routes and can co-operate with other vehicles for rally, reaching a target, accidental cases reporting to nearby hospitals, emergency units. These sensors maintain active monitoring, storing records of test cases, predicting nearby gas stations, storing data for next journey, self-driving cars are some of its applications. The high processing power available with many vehicles allows exploring several possibilities and providing best in class facilities.
The organization of our paper is given as below. Section II. Literature Survey discuses features of recent security in fog/edge computing models. Section III. Methodology presents our SMAP protocol functioning and operations with various security attacks prevention is proved by supporting reasons. Section IV. Results and Discussion gives achieved results with SMAP protocol and comparison with benchmarks. Section V. Conclusion gives the objectives mapping and outcome, followed by references and acknowledgment.
II. LITERATURE SURVEY
As the current systems are developing for adapting to fog/edge architecture, the security and privacy aspect is not progressed enough to predict the requirements for its safety [6] , [9] , [11] . Even though closely matching the architecture of machine to machine (M2M) [15] and smart grids were studied enough. Hence, we will see some literature survey that somehow associates with concerns of the fog:
Mobile devices are in large numbers as compared to any other, at present. Identity-based authentication solutions are provided using a lightweight equipment certification program, having efficiency improvement and reduced bandwidth consumption for transmission. The proposed work by Deng and Li [7] 
considers: (1) Key management flexibility by avoiding secure channel to get keys, (2) Public key system decreases authentication and key negotiation burden and thus improving efficiency (3) Ease of authentication and digital signature's implementation in a distributed environment.
Here, the absence of secure channel for key exchange, a public key model of large dependency and high digital signature calculations are unsuitable for massive fog node based architecture.
A recent survey presented by Mukherjee et al. [6] , shares various insights about the current fog/edge security concerns and challenges.
(1) How to safeguard data against malicious or malfunctioning fog nodes attacks, (2) How to identify malicious insider and exclude him from the system as he steals end users private key and illegitimately access data, (3) How the EU is able to mutually authenticate new fog/edge user within a network to connect with fog server securely, (4) How to support location and identity privacy in UAV assisted fog computing and (5) How to achieve client-to-server and server-to-client authentication represents a challenge as conveyed.
A detailed survey of optimization on IoT public key infrastructure by Kelly and Hammoudeh [5] represents how IoT faces unique security challenges in resource-constrained environment. As IoT is limited by computing, storage, memory and power, it's hard to get deployed of advanced security protocol, which acts as an overhead. PKI is considered again as a secure environment for such devices. Recent research only shows attempts to reduce the size of X.509 certificates or orchestration of DTLS handshake. Virtual resources are also considered that perform implementation of the complex cryptographic protocols as a substitute but still face high dependency and computing challenges. Fragmentation of encryption handshake can be avoided by the use of efficient DTLS handshake protocol frame fit into 802.15.4 packets.
Use of symmetric key for overall communication is still possible threat to all data security in this system.
One Time Password with ECC, a two-factor authentication scheme is approached by Shivraj et al. [4] . The scheme presented here is a hybrid system combining Lamport's One Time Password (OTP) and Identity Based Elliptical Curve Cryptography (IBE-ECC). This scheme is tested with the current authentication system and approached for real-time IoT networks and smart cities. Having a smaller key size and less infrastructure is the objective for showing the optimal performance of that system. Even though the system performs well in comparison by proof with other OTP algorithms in IoT, we will be having genuine algorithms for the new fog system architecture.
Octopus, a mutual authentication scheme is presented by Ibrahim [3] . In this scheme, a new user randomly roaming in the system can mutually authenticate him using a master secret key and also the keys are shared with multiple servers joining the network. The scheme is designed for smart card/devices. As the scheme is better utilized in smart cards and devices its mostly in a fixed manner and hence may face the possibility of masquerading servers, users for reauthentication and repetition of master password with symmetric key encryption/decryption. Nevertheless, repeating a master password is still considered to be unsafe in large scale fog/edge network model.
Computational complexity on combinatorial problems presented by karp [26] , presents a problem on making a maximum number of requests that can be made simultaneously within a network using the concept of Edge-Disjoint Paths (EDP) or Computing Maximum Flow is proved to be NP-Complete. Ultimately, we are trying to overcome this problem by using cryptographic techniques and mathematical functions that can give high security with fewer calculations as possible, to achieve the large number of mutual authentication within a network containing millions of devices with less possible time.
Lightweight mutual authentication protocol for IoT and its applications is proposed by Li et al. [28] . Lightweight protocol used between two lightweight devices operates on public key encryption scheme. This protocol uses challenge and response scheme by encryption for mutual authentication. This type of scheme is represented as an n-pass protocol, as the security level and parameters for encryption determine the number of rounds. The protocol assumes the participants are already aware of their respective public keys and identities. The protocol is found to be performing well when compared to RSA, ECC and their original protocol version as compared to their own optimal scheme. Securing IoT smart homes by access control and mutual authentication is presented by Alshahrani and Traore [32] . An updatable temporary identity and session key for every session by an anonymous and lightweight key exchange and mutual authentication is proposed. Focusing on specific nodes communication, a virtual domain segregation is used for division of devices by a security policy in IoT smart homes. Hence, insider and outsider threats are made less severe by using such lightweight methods. Identity thefts are avoided using by using a new fog computing architecture in IoT devices. This methodology is then compared with other recent benchmarks for communication cost number of messages and total number of bits.
III. METHODOLOGY
The operation for mutual authentication involves at least two communicating parties c, s looking forward establishing secure communication and an authentication server AS to initiate the process.
The protocol ensures confidentiality by the use of public key encryption, integrity by one-way hash function and authentication by mutual agreement between the communicating parties for deciding a final session key in an event of communication. Identity of the system is useful for checking the accuracy of sent message I x , whereas time-stamp t ensures that the message operated is current. All the public keys are stored in the authentication server AS, which helps in registration and authentication of the system.
In SMAP protocol, we store the public key PK x of all the systems including fog/edge server's and client's in Authentication Server AS.As the fog/edge system is dynamic, we always keep a backup AS, in case the original server leaves the network. Hence, AS stores all client and server's public keys PK c , PK s and is responsible for initiating mutual authentication within the network. For every client/server mutual authentication based protocol needs to be complete, to establish trust and initiate secured communication.
A. SECURE MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL (SMAP) PROCESS
Referring to figure 1, the SMAP protocol can be explained as follows with reference to the notation 
Every client requiring to establish secure connection
with a fog server, requests for its public key from AS.The client sends its own identity I c and public key Pk c for its validation. All these parameters are then grouped and encrypted by the fog server's public key E PKs sent by ASfor input to Lightweight Encryption Scheme (LES) [28] . Note here, t c , R c and Pk c are sent for calculation of k c,s and confirming its identity respectively.
c → s:E PKs ((t c , R c ), K c,s, Pk c )
4. After receiving the encrypted message from client c, the fog server decrypts it by using his private key D SKs and confirms the calculation of K c,s by using a hash of t c xor R c . In a similar way, the fog server generates its session key K s,c = H(t s ⊕ R s ). Also, the fog server's absolute network IP address a s and validity of message v are used. All these parameters are then encrypted using the client's public key E PKc and sent to the client. Note: The pseudo-random random number generator used in step 3, 4 and 5 are each with different category of PRNG generators. Also, The LES algorithm takes different random values in its algorithm as input, hence the encryption is not always with the same parameters [28] .
B. ANALYSIS OF HARDNESS OF PSEUDO-RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR [2] [4]
We state about the analysis of hardness of our PRNG generation with respect to the following situations. Let the c 1 and s 1 are any two user's c or s and t 1 and t 2 be two random time instances. Lemma 1: Computing a new PRNG independently from the same c or s and parameters.
Proof: Let PRNG t1 and PRNG t2 , the PRNGs generated at two different instances of time t1 and t2 respectively for c 1 , which are given as
From the independent PRNGs PRNG t1 and PRNG t2 , computing the PRNG, PRNG t3 for the c 1 at t 3 will be given as t 3 > t 2 > t 1 .
Lemma 2:
Computing a new PRNG for a c or s is again independent from other c or s at the same instance of time.
Proof: Let PRNG C1 t and PRNG S1 t , the PRNGs generated at same instances of time on different Fog/Edge layers respectively for c 1 and s 1 , which are given as
Therefore, computing PRNG S1 t is completely independent from the given PRNG C1 t without knowing [t2]s 1 and in actual it is applicable for more than two devices and PRNGs Lemma 3: Computing a new PRNG for a c or s is independent of another c or s at the different instance of time.
Proof: Let PRNG C1 t and PRNG S1 t , the PRNGs generated at different instances of time t 1 and t 2 on different Fog/Edge layers respectively for c 1 and s 1 , which are given as
Thus, computing PRNG S1 t is independent from PRNG C1 t Lemma 4: Computing a new PRNG for a c or s from the known PRNG of same/another Fog layer cor s at same/different instance of time is independent from each other Proof: Referring to Lemma's 1-4, this lemma is also proved. So here different fog layers are independent of generating PRNG with same/different instance of time. Thus, PRNG generation in SMAPPRNG is stronger.
The Table 3 , shows how SMAP can prevent various security attacks [10] , [13] .
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The primary goal of this paper is to analyze both protocol mathematically and experimentally [4] , the efficiency of mutual authentication based on pseudo-random number generator PRNG,hash and key exchange for Fog/Edge. As a part of this, we have implemented and experimented various PRNG compiler parameters including GCC, Borland C/C++ and Turbo Pascal with SHA-256 Hash bit [31] and time stamp having a unique epoch value at every instance of time.
A. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION For experimentation, we have deployed PRNG schemes on Server and Desktop. The PRNG generation configuration is deployed on a system, whose configuration is mentioned in Table 2 . We have conducted load testing with various compilers on the system with varying number of standard parameters for best performance. To enable this, we utilized python version 2.7.5 [16] on CentOS 7 server platform [14] .
We have conducted experiments of generating PRNG using Linear Congruential Generator (LCG) and have also analyzed the performance of Mersenne Twister. Both are well-known PRNG [2] , which follows current standards for generating true PRNGs. We have set parameters differently during the calculation of each key to avoid repetition possibilities of the same pseudo-random number generation.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In Figure 2 , we have analyzed the performance of Mersenne Twister PRNG for generating 100 pseudo-random numbers.In Mersenne Twister Pseudo Random Number Generator provides the distribution of 100 values in 10 9 , which is a very high range. As it is best known, we have also compared it with its competitor Linear Congruential Generator.
In Figures 3-5 , we have shown the generation of 100 LCG pseudo-random numbers with different compiler settings. These settings are unique depending on the parameters of In Table 4 , we can analyze the performance of each LCG compiler having different set of parameters [17] . The time required for generating 100 keys with the portable system is still quite impressive. So generating millions of keys on standard configuration server can be done in hardly one minute of a time. Generating one million keys is enough at time required for setting all devices in connection in the university campus environment. Whereas, for micro-cloud, there will a bunch of devices easily connected in milliseconds.
In above Figures 6-8 , we can see the generation of session keys S K1 , S K2 and S K3 . There are 100 session keys generated in each session as shown in figures based on SHA-256 bit algorithm which takes H(Timestamp ⊕ LCG).
In Figure 9 , we can see that the time comparison of session keys generation is compared with each other for S K1 , S K2 and S K3 No major difference is being noticed while comparing them. Hence, the performance is quite similar while generating keys from a different set of LCG compiler and parameter values. The time taken for each session key set is as given in Table 5 . The encryption in the session key S K3 can be performed using a short public key generation system of Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) [18] can also be best suited for this protocol. Though the time analysis in S K3 will differ based on the configuration of the server and broadband connection. The key exchange process of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman(ECDH) [26] is also the best-suited example. Table 6 . shows a comparison of protocol performance of 3MPAKE [27] with SMAP Fog/Edge. The performance time is shown for calculation of 48 sessions including multiple cryptographic encryption and decryption by LES [28] at server and client side respectively. The system environment used is Cooja emulator, same configuration for performance evaluation of all in Figure 10 . by comparing RSA [29] , [31] , ECC [29] , original LMAP [28] and optimal LMAP [28] all of the security level of 80 bit with SMAP. We have used Contiki OS -Cooja simulator [30] with Mote Type -Tmote Sky@3.9MHz with TX range 50 m for mutual authentication within multiple nodes. The ECC protocol performs handshake by ECDSA. As we can see above, SMAP requires much less time for complete mutual authentication process as compared to other protocols, as SMAP with 1,043ms compared to optimal LMAP 1,401ms, original LMAP 1,535ms, ECC 6,160ms and RSA 23,500ms.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have achieved the objectives as proven by experimentation of performing less possible operations on resource-constrained device, authenticating dynamic location changing fog/edge devices, use minimum infrastructure as possible, unique keys for all levels and use of different PRNG generators at each session. The novel scheme is designed as per the requirements of the new architecture model. The SMAP model is suitable for defending against various attacks and the result section shows better performance on a large number of devices to be authenticated within a short amount of time. SMAP protocol is best suited for Fog/Edge architecture including IoT that can be utilized in Smart University, Smart Labs, Industry 4.0 and Smart Vehicles, where the secured environment is a high priority. Ultimately, we have achieved an efficient protocol as compared with benchmarks including 3MPAKE, RSA, ECC, LMAP and Optimal LMAP. As a future part, we will perform the experimentation on multiple high-end servers from multiple universities for more availability of resources. Also, backup AS is provided in the case to avoid single point failure like kerberos.
